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BOWERS, LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
A MEETING OF HARD AND VERY HARD CASES 
VINCENT J. SAMAR* 
In this article, I intend to point out how two United States Supreme Court 
cases and one state supreme court case have impacted our understanding of 
legal judgments in the area of sexual orientation and the law.  The point of my 
analysis will be to show that the social and cultural contexts in which these 
cases are situated requires courts to move higher up a ladder of increasing 
abstraction, ultimately terminating in a broad-based concern for human rights.  
Taken together, these three cases first illustrate this result by delineating an 
important crossroads between two important jurisprudential divides.  Once this 
is accomplished, these cases will illustrate the need for bridging the gap 
between the divides, although they do not directly offer the intellectual 
apparatus to do this.  For purposes of this article, that apparatus can only be 
suggested. 
The two jurisprudential divides are, on one hand, the so-called “hard” 
cases and, on the other hand, what I shall call the “very hard” cases.  The 
former, the “hard” cases, are cases where no rule of law presents a specific 
legal answer to a particular case, but the background principles underlying the 
political morality of the society do.  Usually, this is because the principles 
differ in weight, and courts are directed to follow the more weighty principle.  
The latter, the “very hard” cases, are cases where the background political 
morality is itself in dispute and the key is to appeal to some broader, more 
general political morality to try to resolve the dispute. 
An example of a “hard” case is Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986.1  
Two examples of “very hard” cases are Lawrence v. Texas2 and Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,3 both decided in 2003.  Together these three 
cases represent an important jurisprudential crossroads between theories of law 
and political morality generally.  Lawrence is particularly interesting in this 
 
* Vincent J. Samar is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago 
and Oakton Community College.  He is taking an LLM at Harvard Law School during the 2004-
05 academic year. 
 1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 3. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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regard and will be addressed last because it points to a clear place where the 
road divides.  The fact that all three cases concern sexual orientation and the 
law illustrates that such cases are profoundly interesting not only in the way 
they search out and challenge long-standing viewpoints about human sexuality 
and gender, but also in the way they force us to rethink our understandings of 
what courts should do when faced with difficult cases. 
These cases make us confront the fact that long-standing categories in 
which legal cases fall are as much a product of political philosophy as they are 
about principles and rules.  The fact political philosophy should enter into the 
picture at all means that the hope remains for rational discourse and debate to 
ultimately usurp extreme prejudices and narrow viewpoints.  Exactly why this 
happens, however, may not always be clear, especially (and perhaps not 
always desirably) when courts have to backtrack from what previously seemed 
to be settled positions, turning the whole judicial decision making process on 
its side.  Understanding the reason courts do this should nevertheless provide 
this insight. This will require a brief digression into the legal basis of the three 
decisions mentioned above, which will show not only where the departure is 
found between what the law is and what it ought to be, but why the latter has a 
normative connection to the former in making sense of the duty to obey the 
law.  It is also my hope that by pointing out the crossroads of the two 
jurisprudential divides, I will be able to show the salience gay rights cases have 
to our more general understanding of the nature of legal judgment. 
In effect, the arguments presented here will implicate broader human rights 
concerns about sexual orientation in general.  These arguments will suggest 
why sexual orientation issues may not be simply reduced to the jurisprudence 
of a single legal system, especially a system that claims to find its foundation 
in democratic theory.  More specifically, in a legal system such as ours, the 
duty to obey the law is normally connected to the both the legislature’s 
responsibility to provide for the common good and the court’s responsibility to 
do justice.4  However, when this does not happen, or fails to happen for certain 
groups of people, a closer look at the surface topology of the language is 
required to determine what principles of morality are really at stake. 
The choice of the three cases I mentioned helps to guide us in just this 
way.  The significance of each will point out a failure and a redirection in legal 
reasoning that can open doors to a greater appreciation of human rights in the 
American constitutional context.  To show this I will demonstrate that when 
Bowers was decided, it should have been no more than a “hard” case with a 
different outcome because of the then-prevailing political morality of our 
society.  In contrast, its language notwithstanding, Lawrence is a much harder 
case, as the background political morality that was available but not taken 
 
 4. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 6 (1955). 
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advantage of in Bowers could no longer provide the same solution.  Thus, a 
new approach is now necessary.  A fortiori, Goodridge is a case that motivates 
a search for a still more abstract and deeper background political morality in 
light of the societal debate over the moral and legal legitimacy of same-sex 
marriage.  Before I can be any more explicit about these matters, I need to say 
something more about what I mean by the appellations “hard” and “very hard” 
in context to these cases. 
The book Justifying Judgment: Practicing Law and Philosophy deals with 
the issue of resolving legal cases where the law is unclear and where there are 
varying degrees of controversy over what legally should be done.  Because I 
believe that the arguments in that book will be useful in clarifying what was 
occurring in the above-mentioned cases, permit me to begin by quoting a small 
portion of that book’s preface as an introduction to the forthcoming discussion 
of the case law: 
Ever since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously in 
1977 lawyers have been discussing ‘hard cases.’  The precedents in hard cases 
go in both directions, and no clear legal rules apply.  One suggestion for 
deciding these cases has appealed to broader substantive principles of society’s 
political morality.  By ‘political morality’ I mean the application of morality to 
the operation and justification of political institutions.  The problem with this 
suggestion, however, is that it presupposes that a judge is not faced with 
having to decide a case in which the society’s political morality is internally 
inconsistent or under serious attack from some alternative political morality. 
[This was true, for example, in our own history in the 18th century, when the 
political morality that supported slavery came under attack by the abolitionist 
movement.]  The alternative political morality [in that case the morality of the 
abolitionists] may be the position of some substantial portion of society, or it 
may be some ideal that seems to the judge to be more persuasive [than the 
dominant moral viewpoint].  Either way, when the alternative occurs, the judge 
is faced with a very hard case [because now there is no clear principle of law 
or social morality that gives the judge a correct way to decide which way the 
case should go].5 
I.  WHY BOWERS V. HARDWICK WAS, AT MOST, A “HARD” CASE 
Bowers v. Hardwick involved the unchallenged legal entry of a Georgia 
police officer into the home of Michel Hardwick on the evening of August 3, 
1982.6  There the officer found Michael Hardwick and another adult male 
engaged in an act of oral sodomy in Michael’s bedroom.7  Michael was 
 
 5. VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, at ix 
(1998). 
 6. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88. 
 7. Id. at 187. 
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subsequently charged with violating section 16-6-2  of the Georgia Code,  a 
statute that made it a crime to engage in sodomy with another, even in the 
privacy of one’s home,8 and was punishable by not less than one and up to 
twenty years in prison.9  The Georgia statute stated that “[a] person commits 
the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act 
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”10  
The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Georgia sodomy statute 
was challenged on due process and privacy grounds.11 
The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute, distinguished the portion of 
the statute pertaining to homosexual sodomy from the remainder of the act, 
which also included heterosexual sodomy.12  Specifically, the Court, referring 
to the portion of the statute making homosexual sodomy a crime, ruled, per 
Justice White, that prior case law did not put adult consensual homosexual 
sodomy in the home beyond state proscription.13  The basis of the Court’s 
rationale was that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation 
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other [was] . . . 
demonstrated.”14  Nor did the cases protect any form of private sexual conduct 
between consenting adults.15  Thus, Bowers was a “hard” case. 
While there were no prior privacy cases directly on point, the Court 
already had within its established constitutional privacy jurisprudence a set of 
principles that should have guided the Court to decide the case very differently 
from the way it ultimately did.  This suggests a prejudice against homosexuals 
on the part of some of the justices who participated in the decision.  Indeed, 
this was particularly clear from Justice Burger’s concurring opinion where he 
said: “Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been 
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.  
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in the Judeao-Christian moral 
and ethical standards.”16  The set of privacy principles that should have 
decided this case, and no doubt would have had the prejudices suggested by 
 
 8. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 9. Id. § 16-6-2(b). 
 10. Id. § 16-6-2(a). 
 11. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 196 n.8 (in Bowers an equal protection challenge was not 
raised). 
 12. See id. at 190 (clarifying that the Court’s ruling dealt only with “whether the Federal 
Constitution [sic] confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,” even 
though the statute did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy). 
 13. See id. at 190-91. 
 14. Id. at 191. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring). 
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the above-quoted passages not existed, have their foundation in three different 
areas of the law: Fourth Amendment, tort, and constitutional privacy.   
A. The Fourth Amendment 
In the Fourth Amendment area, the right to privacy protects persons, 
information, and places against unreasonable searches and seizures.17  What 
makes a search unreasonable is the presence of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy coupled with the absence of a warrant based on probable cause that a 
crime was about to take place.18  This right to privacy of information and 
places was specifically directed against the government, limiting its pursuit of 
a criminal investigation from becoming a mere fishing expedition of possible 
criminal activity.19  A perhaps now antiquated example of this rule would be 
the person in the glass-enclosed telephone booth who had a reasonable 
expectation of not being overheard, but no such expectation of not being 
seen.20 
B. Tort 
In contrast to the Fourth Amendment right to privacy was the development 
of the privacy tort in civil law.  Here the issue, as described in a famous law 
review article at the turn of the last century, was protecting against 
unreasonable invasions into personal affairs by the press and other persons.21  
Prosser describes this tort as involving four separate concerns: 
 Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
 Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
 Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
 Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.22 
Similar to the Fourth Amendment area, the civil law privacy tort was to 
serve as a protection of information and places.  However, this tort is directed 
 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: 
GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-28 (1991). 
 18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the zone of 
privacy extends as far as a court would consider a reasonable person to expect). 
 19. See generally id. at 357. 
 20. See id. at 352 (government-placed wire tap captured petitioner’s calls from inside glass-
enclosed telephone booth). 
 21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195-97 (1890). 
 22. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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against other persons rather than the government.23  In this way, privacy 
became more than just a protection against certain governmental intrusions, but 
also a safeguard of individual personhood and autonomy from the prying eyes 
of others.24 
C. Constitutional Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment right to privacy and the privacy tort were not the 
only sources of privacy protection that had been recognized prior to the 
Court’s decision in Bowers.  Beginning in the 1960s with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court began to set out constitutional privacy law 
jurisprudence based on a liberty right.25  In Griswold, the Court upheld the 
constitutional privacy rights of a married couple to use contraceptives and of 
physicians to advise their use against a state law that prohibited both.26  In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended that right to include unmarried 
persons.27  In Carey v. Population Services International, the Court extended 
the right still further, striking down a law which made it a crime to distribute 
contraceptives to minors.28  In Roe v. Wade, the Court extended constitutional 
privacy protections to a mother’s choice to have an abortion, noting that the 
fetus was not a person under the law.29 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area was not confined to 
physical activity that was arguably self-regarding.30  The Court had also 
upheld, in Stanley v. Georgia, the right of a person to possess “obscene matter” 
in the privacy of his home.31  In that case, the Court stated: 
This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is 
fundamental to our free society.  Moreover, in the context of this case—a 
prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a 
person’s own home—that right takes on an added dimension.  For also 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from 
unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.32 
D. Application to Bowers 
 
 23. See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 
1894-96 (1981). 
 24. See id. at 1896-97. 
 25. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 26. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring). 
 27. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 28. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). 
 29. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 158 (1973). 
 30. See SAMAR, supra note 17, at 65-68. 
 31. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
 32. Id. at 564 (citations omitted). 
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Despite all the precedent that might have suggested the contrary, the 
Bowers Court refused to find constitutional privacy protection for two 
consenting adults to engage in same-sex sodomy in the home.33  Prior to 
Bowers, two cases, one a New York court of appeals case, People v. Onofre,34 
and the other a Virginia federal district court case, Doe v. Commonwealth’s 
Attorney,35 had gone in opposite directions on whether a fundamental right to 
privacy covers and protects such activities.  Bowers was not a “very hard” case 
because the Court had enough of an indication of society’s political morality 
from its own past privacy decisions to render a decision against such statutes, 
even though it chose not to do so.  Consequently, at the point when the Court 
heard Bowers, constitutional jurisprudence had already been sufficiently 
developed to afford protection to Michael Hardwick.36  Still, if there was any 
question about this matter, it could have been reasoned as follows: 
A mere description of the action involved in Bowers does not impinge the 
basic interest of any other person in the relevant group of actors.  The Court 
should have first acknowledged this, and then if it so thought, said what the 
basis was for any derivative interest trumping privacy.  The Court did none of 
this, and that failure more than even its conclusion marks this case as a 
particularly notorious departure from the traditional protection afforded 
fundamental human rights.37 
The same precursory precedent that was available to the Court in Bowers 
was not unconditionally available to the Court’s more recent decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,38 which overruled Bowers.  For reasons to be discussed 
below, and notwithstanding the Court’s own language, Lawrence was a “very 
hard” case. 
II.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE—A CLEARLY “VERY HARD” CASE 
 
 33. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
 34. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (N.Y. 1980) (holding unconstitutional 
statute declaring consensual sodomy or deviate sexual intercourse between persons not married to 
each other criminal), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
 35. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, 403 F.Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975) (holding 
constitutional statute making private consensual sodomy between adult males a crime), aff’d 
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
 36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (arguing that the Court’s prior cases have not “construed the 
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy,” and that those 
cases “were described as dealing with child rearing and education; with family relationships; with 
procreation; with marriage; with contraception; and with abortion” (citations omitted)). 
 37. Vincent J. Samar, Gay-Rights as a Particular Instantiation of Human Rights, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 983, 1016 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
 38. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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The claim that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided is based on the 
view that the prior privacy cases cannot be interpreted merely as a concern 
about marriage and procreation, as was suggested in Justice White’s majority 
opinion in Bowers.39  This is because neither Eisenstadt v. Baird,40 Carey v. 
Population Services International,41 nor Roe v. Wade42 specifically dealt with 
marriage, and moreover, while Roe is contrary to the protection of procreation, 
it does protect the right to make procreative choices.  Although one might say 
that these earlier cases were distinguishable because they did not deal directly 
with the question of state regulation of adult consensual sexual activities such 
as fornication, they nevertheless did lay out the predicate for protection of non-
procreative sex among unmarried persons, which is what state regulation of 
adult consensual sexual activity concerns. 
On the other hand, the majority’s opinion in Bowers was correct in that 
these earlier privacy cases did concern the choice to bear children and whether 
that choice could be compelled by the state.  Bowers only concerns that choice 
indirectly because same-sex relationships are not biologically reproductive.  
Still, the distinction here appears to be without a difference if the net effect of 
the earlier cases is to protect behavior that may not be procreative in nature.  
For this reason too, it appears that Bowers is nothing more than a “hard” case, 
where a new variation of an old issue had to be decided under the then-
prevailing law. 
A “very hard” case is one where the correctness of society’s political 
morality is itself in doubt.  Take, for example, the situation of same-sex 
marriage. At stake in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health43 was the question of the moral 
legitimacy of same-sex marriage, over which our society is very divided.  The 
issue in that case was not whether marriage is a fundamental right; that was 
decided in Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923,44 and repeated again in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma in 1942.45  Nor was it undecided whether miscegenation statutes 
were unconstitutional; that was decided in Loving v. Virginia in 1967.46  What 
our society is divided over is whether the right to marry includes the right to 
marry someone of the same sex.  This is evident from recent legislative 
 
 39. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91. 
 40. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 41. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 43. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 44. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 45. Skinner v. Ok., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 46. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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reactions to the possibility of same-sex marriage47 and from various public 
opinion polls.48  Indeed, every argument, from the analytical argument that the 
institution of marriage is defined to be between opposite-sex partners49 to the 
normative argument that state support of marriage exists primarily to 
encourage the procreation of children,50 has been used to try to justify the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage.  Singer v. Hara, a 1974 case from the State 
of Washington, provides a good example of these two arguments being used in 
tandem against an attempt to argue that prohibitions against same-sex marriage 
violate the U.S. Constitution.51 
However, if the state’s normative argument is merely that marriage is 
defined to include only opposite-sex couples, then the state has begged the 
question by simply constructing into the definition of marriage, without 
argument, the very thing it has sought to prohibit; namely, gay and lesbian 
marriage.  This is an analytical move that is completely blind to why the state 
might afford a right to marry at all.  Marriage is, after all, not a “natural kind” 
containing a unique set of natural constitutives.52  Rather, it is a social 
construction designed to further certain social goals of society.53  Following 
this line of thought, if it is the state’s position that marriage exists for the sole 
purpose of supporting procreation, then the state’s position is weak by being 
focused exclusively on procreation, as opposed to other normative values like 
stability and self-fulfillment that the state may also value.  This is made clear 
by the fact that state marriage laws allow heterosexuals to marry who do not 
intend (and in some cases could not) have children and do not want to adopt 
children.54 
On the other hand, if the right to marry is of value only to take advantage 
of certain benefits that accrue through marriage (such as the ability to file a 
joint income tax return, having automatic rights of inheritance, or rights to 
make health and property decisions for a spouse), that too is a weak argument 
 
 47. Bill Walsh, Demos Fear Fallout of Gay Nuptials Question; Some Say Wedge Issue on 
Ballot Helps Republican Candidates, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 23, 2004, at 20; Fred Barnes, How 
Many Gays Do You Know?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at A14. 
 48. Fred Bayles, Same-Sex Marriage Begins in Mass.: Gay Couples Line Up to Apply for 
Licenses, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004, at 1A (showing 55% of Americans opposed to same-sex 
marriage, down from 65% last December). 
 49. Dean v. D.C., 653 A. 2d 307, 315-16 (D.C. 1995). 
 50. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 461-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 51. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 52. See generally W.V. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 114 (1969) (discussing the philosophical doctrine of “natural kinds”). 
 53. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1434, 
1485 (1993). 
 54. See Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and 
Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
98 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:89 
 
for same-sex marriage.55  That is to say, there may be alternative ways to 
provide these benefits, such as the civil unions that exist in the State of 
Vermont.56  In that case, the most one might hope to say—adopting for the 
moment a utilitarian approach—is that it is for the greatest good of the greatest 
number to allow lesbians and gays to unionize and heterosexuals to marry.  But 
then the resolution of the marriage question is strictly dependent on a 
cost/benefit analysis of how much of a benefit to how many different people is 
served by allowing gays and lesbians to unionize but not marry.  In this 
situation, the benefit is going to be the upholding of certain social 
biases/prejudices regarding who can marry; it is no better than the biased-based 
white supremacy justification implicit in the Virginia miscegenation statute 
struck down in Loving v. Virginia.57  As an aside, there may be many economic 
benefits resulting from allowing same-sex marriage in the form of renting 
spaces for wedding receptions, buying flowers and presents, renting apparel, 
hiring bands, and going on honeymoons. 
Nevertheless, because utility may not protect against bias and prejudice in 
the short run, whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to legally marry 
must depend on whether denying such a right is a violation of fundamental 
fairness, just as separate but equal education was found to be fundamentally 
unfair to African-Americans attending public schools.58  Therefore, same-sex 
marriage seems to provide a good example of a “very hard” case, especially 
when it is recognized that appealing to society’s existing political morality will 
not likely resolve the problem.  But, then, to what should a court appeal to 
decide such a case, and how would a court be able to justify whatever choice 
of source it settled upon? 
It might be questioned why same-sex marriage is not simply a “hard” case 
where judges and others may simply not like the result that equal protection 
clauses force upon them.  The answer is that equal protection clauses are not 
all that clear.  For example, take the federal Equal Protection Clause, which is 
part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.59  When the 
amendment was passed, it was designed to remove a certain form of racial 
discrimination that was likely to keep former African-American slaves as an 
underclass in the former succeeding southern states.60  However, broader 
 
 55. See id. at 364-72. 
 56. See id. at 372-79 (also including possible limitations on such unions).  In this regard, 
Professor Strasser also explains and critiques domestic partnerships as another alternative route to 
marriage.  See id. at 380-81. 
 57. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 2, 7, (1967). 
 58. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 60. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 162 
(1998). 
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interpretations of the amendment have led to its use as a means for removing 
discrimination against politically powerless classes of persons who are 
identified by some immutable trait through no fault of their own.61  Would 
such an immutable trait include finding happiness by having a recognized legal 
relationship with another person of the same sex?  That is a question for which 
the courts have been uncertain.62 
Put another way, what justifies the courts in deciding “easy” cases on a 
positivistic interpretation of laws,63 such as laws enacted by the Congress and 
signed by the President?64  In “hard” cases, what justifies the courts in 
following a more Dworkian-like approach that seeks to protect the integrity of 
law by making sure that it conforms to society’s political morality?65  Finally, 
what justifies the courts in deciding “very hard” cases following a de novo 
natural law/natural rights approach when the society’s political morality is 
itself in doubt?66  This is the central question that Justifying Judgment seeks to 
unravel, and it is especially poignant in areas concerning sexual orientation and 
the law. 
III.  WHEN RESORTING TO POLITICAL THEORY IS NECESSARY TO DO JUSTICE 
Part of the difficulty we have in resolving this problem discussed supra in 
Section II is that too often we tend to compartmentalize our thinking of how 
courts should operate with such popular expressions as “activist” or 
“conservative” court.67  We tend to look at law as either an open or a closed 
system, and think that the political responsibility of judges is to either preserve 
institutional or background rights.68  What I attempt to show in Justifying 
Judgment (and hope to illustrate in this article) is that this 
compartmentalization of the law is too static in that it blocks us from seeing 
 
 61. See Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions – Fundamental Right to 
Travel or “Newcomers” as a Suspect Class? 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1017-20 (1975). 
 62. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 63. A positivistic interpretation is an interpretation that decides what the law is based on its 
having the correct pedigree.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 859 (7th ed. 1999). 
 64. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-98, 100-09 (2d ed. 1994) (showing that under a 
modern positivistic conception, laws affecting behavior, called “primary rules,” take their validity 
from conformance to some recognized secondary rule of procedure, the same also being true for 
determining the validity of most secondary rules, except for the ultimate secondary rule of 
recognition, which exists by mere acceptance). 
 65. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986). 
 66. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 7, 1991, 
at 41, 44. 
 67. See, e.g., Patti Waldmeir, Big Eye on the Little Guy, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 10, 2004, 
at 16; Mimi Hall & Andrea Stone, Activists May Use Ruling to Stir up Voters About Values, USA 
TODAY, June 27, 2003, at 6A. 
 68. See SAMAR, supra note 5, at 68-72. 
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why we have legal institutions at all.  Such institutions serve to allow for a 
deeper level of moral reflection that goes beyond the consideration of 
individual preferences and allows movement between institutional and 
background rights.  The former represent the specific rights individuals have 
before the law.69  The latter represent a more abstract set of political rights 
people are thought to possess in a free society, which, when not guaranteed by 
the legislature, ought to be guaranteed by the courts.70 
The point is that if courts are to do justice and legislatures are to promote 
the common good, more flexibility is needed.  This is true whether we take the 
judges to be activist or conservative, because any action they take is going to 
be shrouded in language concerning their duty to obey law.  But from where 
would this duty arise?  The answer lies in what we take to be the 
responsibilities associated with the various practices of governmental 
institutions and the particular duties of the governmental actors involved in 
those practices to insure that such responsibilities are met. 
What is perhaps surprising to learn from a study of legal decisions is not 
that there are differences in judicial viewpoints over what the laws entail, as 
would be the case, for example, if some judges believe in following original 
intent71 while others believe in adopting the law to the changing needs of 
society.72  What is both surprising and interesting is that the very concept of 
why even a very clearly written law should be followed is not at all obvious 
from delineating the legal philosophy of any judge.73  This is because the 
question of why the law should be followed is not itself a question of legal 
philosophy, but rather of political philosophy.74  By “legal philosophy” I mean 
both what is to count as law and when a so-called law should validly be given 
effect.  The reason why traditional natural law theories appear to answer this 
question (as opposed to positivism, legal realism, or even Dworkian legal 
idealism where society’s political morality is in doubt) is that such theories 
conflate the question of what the law is and why we should obey it.  The 
question of why one should obey the law is not to be found in the practice of 
law itself but in the concern over whether courts should follow unjust laws.  
That is to say, it is not a question for judges alone, but for legal academics, 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. The relationship between background and institutional rights is theoretical and is meant 
to convey two different ideas about what duties courts have.  See id. 
 71. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (arguing for a framers’ interpretation of the law). 
 72. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 
559 (1999) (discussing different theories of constitutional interpretation). 
 73. See Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law 
Field: 1981-1982, 96 F.R.D. 437, 444 (1983). 
 74. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 13-14, 31-36 (2001). 
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political philosophers, and the citizenry at large who seek broader justificatory 
grounds before accepting any such dogma-affecting behavior.  Judges 
operating from within the internal point of view accept a responsibility to 
follow the law because they view their society as nearly just, and they obey the 
laws until changed by the legislature or through the various methods of 
constitutional or legislative interpretation.75  “Very hard” cases, however, 
disrupt this neat avoidance of the issue by forcing judges to confront the 
question of the justice of the legal system from outside their own point of view.  
Marriage, for example, can no longer be assumed to between a man and a 
woman because that issue is exactly what is in question.  “Very hard” cases 
arise when judges confront either internally inconsistent principles or 
principles subject to some greater outside challenge as to their justice.  
Whenever this happens, judges should be prepared to engage a more open, 
reflective process in which the institutional grounds of their own duty to follow 
the law can no longer be assumed, but must, at least to some extent, be 
justified. 
In the broader sense, this means that even in a society that considers itself 
to be nearly just, if it does not engage in this reflective process, the laws it 
follows will at most be virtual (at least until “very hard” cases are confronted) 
in the sense that the courts will assume a duty to obey them without such duty 
ever being shown to exist.76  Here, I use the word “law” in the broad sense that 
natural law theorists do in order to encompass the outcrop of society’s serious 
reflection of how to decide difficult cases.  The distinction between internal 
and external points of view brings us to the relationship of legal and political 
philosophy by making this issue obvious, as it does when courts confront the 
question of same-sex marriage.  By the same token, the problem with “very 
hard” cases is that having made the issue evident, it now needs to be solved if 
justice is to be done. 
Still, that some cases should be “very hard,” such as Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,77 while others are merely “hard” cases, such as 
Bowers v. Hardwick,78 does not say much about what the topography looks 
like at the border.  For this reason, the last of the three cases I consider is 
Lawrence v. Texas,79  which in many respects is similar to Bowers, but in one 
important respect is more comparable to Goodridge. 
IV.  LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BORDER 
 
 75. See SAMAR, supra note 5, at 76-78. 
 76. Id. at 96. 
 77. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 78. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 79. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court made up for its prior—now admitted—
mistake in Bowers v. Hardwick by allowing a challenge to the constitutionality 
of a Texas sodomy statute that made adult consensual same-sex behavior a 
crime, even when performed in private.80  The facts were almost identical to 
those in Bowers, except the sodomy concerned anal sex, not oral sex, and there 
was a different legal—though still unrelated—reason for the police entry into 
the home.81  One very interesting aspect of the case is the fact that it came 
down just seventeen years after a similar Georgia statute82 was upheld as 
constitutional in Bowers.  Another important difference between the two cases 
was that the Lawrence Court seemed willing to pay more attention to 
extralegal and nonlegal sources.83 
In Lawrence, the Court overruled Bowers.84  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy grounded his opinion in several earlier cases, including 
Griswold v. Connecticut85 and Roe v. Wade,86 because both recognized a 
fundamental privacy interest protected by the Due Process Clause.87  
Kennedy’s majority opinion in effect displaced what dissenting Justice Scalia 
noted was the previous view of the Court (and, no doubt, was still the view of 
himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and probably Justice Thomas), that a 
particular practice traditionally viewed as immoral could be “a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”88 
Kennedy’s broader due process interpretation in Lawrence may have been 
out-of-step with current law, however, if Bowers were still good law.  As 
Lawrence and Bowers are not logically reconcilable, Bowers’s status as 
controlling law had to be overcome.  Kennedy dealt with this issue by showing 
that Bowers was wrong when decided and remains wrong today.89  It was 
necessary for the Court to find that Bowers was wrongly decided because, 
under a certain version of positivism, once Bowers was decided, it became part 
of the very law that Kennedy had to interpret.90  Indeed, even from the position 
 
 80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-64.  The Texas statute at issue in Lawrence was TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003). 
 81. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63 (the police entered the home as a result of a reported 
weapons disturbance). 
 82. The statute in question in Bowers was GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 83. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. 
 84. Id. at 578. 
 85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65. 
 88. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 566-68. 
 90. The point here is that if positivism (or legal realism, which holds the view that the “law” 
is what the courts say the law is) claims that what the highest court decides is now the law, then 
the Supreme Court’s prior determination in Bowers would make that the law of the land. 
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of a natural law theorist, Kennedy’s decision would be problematic if Bowers 
were deemed morally correct.91 
As a ground for overturning Bowers, Kennedy showed that the 
suppositions determining that decision—views of Western Civilization towards 
homosexuality—were incorrect and inadequate ways of explaining both the 
law that preceded it and the law ensuing from it.92  First, Kennedy examined 
the history and weak enforcement of sodomy statutes that preceded Bowers.93  
Second, he noted that the prior development of the Model Penal Code 
disavowed making private, consensual, adult sexual activity criminal.94  Third, 
the post-Bowers case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey re-affirmed Roe, and recognized that due process protected the deep-
seated value in personal autonomy and human dignity.95  Finally, Justice 
Kennedy focused on various recent international human rights documents and 
decisions affirming privacy and equality rights for gays and lesbians.96 
What is striking is that Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence is difficult to fit 
into a standard positivist model of law, like that of H.L.A. Hart’s.  This 
difficulty exists because Hart treats positivism as not only separating law from 
morality and providing an analytical analysis of concepts, but also treats it as 
establishing formal criteria for determining what the law is.97  In other words, 
if a statute or case decision has the correct pedigree, it is the law regardless of 
whether we like its content.  Kennedy’s view is arguably more consistent with 
Dworkin’s model, because Kennedy attempts to balance previously established 
principles against those raised in Bowers.  However, the Dworkin model 
cannot easily explain why the weight of relevant principles may now have 
shifted.98  Internal principles, including those directing courts to take account 
of society’s changing views, are themselves relative to such change.  What 
Kennedy did not do was articulate a clear way of answering these questions 
within the American constitutional framework.  This author believes that 
Kennedy’s decision was correct; however, the task of formulating such an 
articulation of how to answer these questions within the American 
constitutional framework is still incomplete. 
 
 91. The issue here is different, as it begs the question of whether or not morality is relative to 
changing beliefs. 
 92. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 93. Id. at 558-71. 
 94. Id. at 572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)). 
 95. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 851 (1992). 
 96. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. 
 97. See Brian Leiter, Beyond The Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 22 (2003). 
 98. See id. at 27-28. 
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V.  TOWARDS A MORE COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL DECISION-
MAKING 
At this point, I would like to offer an interpretative suggestion about what 
courts should do to decide “very hard” cases.  This suggestion may explain 
Justice Kennedy’s decision as well as provide a predicate for what courts 
should do to decide all such cases.  My suggestion is to adopt a metatheory99 
that tells courts how to pick and choose among competing legal theories.  The 
justification for adopting such a metatheory, from the judge’s point of view, is 
that it will provide a basis for making decisions in “very hard” cases by 
answering requisite questions that would otherwise be unanswerable.  The 
metatheory should also tell judges that in “very hard” cases it is both necessary 
and appropriate to go beyond traditional legal theory in pursuit of what I call 
the best theory of politics.  This is necessary to bring out the duty to obey law 
formulated as I have shown as a normative, and not strictly analytical, idea.  
With this picture in mind, I want to suggest five criteria that a court could rely 
on when deciding “easy,” “hard,” and “very hard” cases: 
1. When the traditional sources of law are clear and on point, a judge 
should rely on these sources if the society views itself as nearly just, 
despite her own views as to the most just result . . . . 
2. If the traditional sources of law include past case precedents, then, if 
the society is nearly just, a judge should analogize the case and reason 
by analogy to bring it under the particular precedent that would 
provide the most just result. 
3. If the traditional sources of law are not clear or on point and the case 
involves a question of economic or social policy as opposed to right or 
justice, then, if the society is nearly just, the court should follow an 
economic analysis or appropriate policy approach to deciding what 
would best serve the common good. 
4. When the traditional sources of law are not clear or on point and the 
case involves a fundamental question of justice, then if the society is 
nearly just, a judge should interpret the traditional legal sources, 
considering the society’s prevailing political morality to produce the 
most just result. 
5. In cases where the society is not nearly just or where the particular 
issue is so controversial as not to be resolvable within the society’s 
 
 99. A metatheory is “a theory concerned with the investigation, analysis, or description of 
theory itself.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED 1421 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. et al. eds., 1993). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] BOWERS, LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 105 
 
political morality, because the society’s political morality is itself in 
question, then, despite whether the law is clear and on point, a judge 
has no political responsibility to follow the law.  In such a case, the 
judge’s responsibility is to act upon the best political theory the court 
can find to do justice and, if possible, to create along the way 
democratic procedures that will be constitutionally liberal and 
concerned for the equal opportunity of all individuals.100 
At this point it might be noted that the criteria do not require judges to seek 
validation for the legal system in every case, provided that society considers 
itself nearly just and the case is no more than a “hard” case.101  This is to avoid 
adding unnecessary complexity both to a legal system that is already 
overburdened and to the duties of judges who may not be properly trained.  It 
is also to ensure that some level of justice is done for all who come before the 
system.  In those few cases that really are “very hard,” the criteria do demand 
just this sort of “philosopher-king” effort, and there the added requirement 
does seem appropriate.  Some examples will help illustrate the theory’s utility. 
Utilizing the metatheory and its five criteria of decision making, I am now 
in a position to fit the three cases I presented at the beginning of this article 
into a broader framework of how the law should operate to resolve each of 
them.  Bearing in mind that there will be differences depending on whether the 
cases are “easy,” “hard,” or “very hard,” here is how each case-type might be 
resolved. 
I will start with a case-type I have not discussed because it may be thought 
to be an “easy” case, namely, the case of a homosexual-bashing.  This example 
seems to fit the first criterion because the statute in this case, most likely a 
battery statute, is clear and there is no serious question of justice at stake in 
punishing direct uses of force and violence against a non-threatening person.  I 
am putting aside here any free speech issue that might arise from the 
augmentation of a penalty by simply assuming, for the purposes of the 
example, that no such augmentation occurs.  The difficult question in this area 
is whether augmenting a punishment to target thoughts is a violation of the 
First Amendment.  There, the question approaches a “hard” case where the 
society’s political morality would seem to recognize higher penalties for 
premeditation in the criminal law or willful and wanton conduct in the torts 
area.  In that instance my fourth criterion for decision making, requiring the 
 
 100. SAMAR, supra note 5, at 76-77. 
 101. Here I differ from an earlier aspect of Ronald Dworkin’s work where he would have his 
judge fit each decision with every other possible decision he or she subsequently plans to make.  
See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 161-62 (1985).  Dworkin later relaxed the 
requirement a bit to require only putting together a coherent scheme of law within the area in 
which the decision is rendered.  See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 252-53. 
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society’s political morality to rank the value of thought in the context of hate-
supported violence, seems appropriate.  Further, that decision will no doubt  
rekindle an important discussion balancing First Amendment liberty interests 
against Fourteenth Amendment equality concerns. 
Bowers v. Hardwick102 seemed like it should have been a good fit to the 
fourth criterion because the prevailing political morality of society was already 
present to resolve a conflict in case precedent.  Two important constituents of 
that morality (as reflected in the case law) are the separate notions of negative 
freedom103 and self-regardingness,104 which seemed evident in the prior 
privacy cases.105  These two notions, when put together, should have presented 
the Court with the idea of a private act.  This idea could have been found to be 
present in the Bowers case, but for some unexplained reason the Court declined 
to find such a private act.106 
Kennedy’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas107  fits my fifth criterion of being 
a “very hard” case in which extralegal aspects concerning the duty to obey law 
were taken into account but not articulated.  Similarly, the decision to legalize 
same-sex marriage also fits the fifth criterion because a court must go beyond 
society’s political morality by interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to 
unravel the institution of marriage itself.  Here the issue is not to make the 
institution (as it is traditionally construed) available to all people equally, but 
to question whether the institution is fairly constituted.  Let me elaborate just a 
bit. 
To deny one class of adult citizens the right to choose whom to marry 
(rather than just affording them the right to marry), without a compelling 
reason, may undermine the political responsibility courts have to do justice by 
affording every human being a right to dignity.  At least, this would be an 
important broad-based duty-prescribing question for the courts to consider.  In 
our system, the Equal Protection Clause was designed to avoid past practices 
 
 102. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 103. Negative freedom is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints.  ONLINE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/ (last visited Nov. 1, 
2004). 
 104. Self-regardingness is where one’s actions do not, in the first instance, affect other then 
oneself.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (1988). 
 105. SAMAR, supra note 17, at 65. 
 106. See id. at 68, where I offer the definition that “[a]n action is self-regarding (private) with 
respect to a group of other actors if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first 
instance on the basic interests of the actor and not on the interests of the specified class of actors.”  
By “in the first instance” I mean that a mere description of the action, “without the inclusion of 
any additional facts or causal theories” does not suggest of a conflict.  Id. at 67. By “basic 
interest” I mean an “interest independent of conceptions about facts and social conventions.”  Id. 
 107. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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that may, upon reflection, turn out to be unjust.108  As Cass Sunstein has noted, 
the clause is forward-looking in just the opposite way that the Due Process 
Clause is backward-looking.109  This means that courts are obligated to make 
use of the Equal Protection Clause “to invalidate practices that were 
widespread at the time of its ratification and were expected to endure.”110  Put 
another way, the Clause recognizes that a system of legal rules may not always 
be adequate to resolve every case that comes along because the rules 
themselves embody certain background prejudices.  This suggests that 
occasionally it may be necessary for courts to look beyond the political 
morality of the society if justice is to be done. 
VI.  POLITICAL MORALITY 
Here it may be appropriate to recognize the likelihood that many people 
may feel uneasy with this fifth principle, even with this somewhat narrow 
application, because it allows courts to step outside a conventional legal 
interpretation of law in search of justice.  Undoubtedly, some may wonder 
whether this opens the door to judicial anarchy by producing results that 
represent the idiosyncratic moral views of the judges, which may be 
considered good only when the public shares these virtues but not otherwise.  
Obviously this issue is serious.  However, the fact that in a few “very hard” 
cases judges may need to step outside the prevailing political morality does not 
mean, as the other principles attest, that in every case there are good reflective 
grounds for doing so.  Nor does it mean that law is unprincipled because any 
argument outside of what may be thought as traditional legal argument opens 
the door to a “nowheresville” of idiosyncratic moral theory.111 
The contrary to seeing law as unprincipled is seeing law as following a 
doctrine of political responsibility from which we can derive a duty to obey 
law.  The duty to obey law is based on the state’s political obligation to respect 
and advance human dignity.112  Even if there are disagreements over what that 
outside doctrine is, it will be a worthwhile effort to determine what it might be. 
 
 108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the 
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Here I distinguish myself from Richard Posner, who discounts the use of moral theory in 
law.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
(1999). 
 112. My point here is that, at least in a Western-styled democracy, for a legal system to be 
morally justified such that a normative duty to obey law can be derived, the legal system must 
require respect for individual human autonomy in the sense of upholding individual self-rule.  
Failure to respect such autonomy is to undermine at least one important argument for law.  See 
SAMAR, supra note 17, at 90-103. 
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While others may differ on just how to set out this area of political 
responsibility—whether to follow, for example, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, 
or some more utilitarian theory—I prefer to look to the writings of Alan 
Gewirth who believes that voluntariness and purposiveness are necessary 
starting elements for any moral theory113 and, consequently, that these 
elements are necessary for any morally justified basis for following law.  I 
chose to look to Gewirth here because his system provides the best starting 
point for grounding rights to freedom and well-being, which our legal system 
and society generally seem most concerned to support.114 
Here, freedom means that one acts by one’s own unforced choice with 
knowledge of relevant circumstances and well-being means that one can act for 
purposes of one’s own good.115  Together, these two rights arise out of a 
dignity-based notion of individual agency in which everyone affirms their 
rights, from their own point of view, of maximizing their own individual self-
fulfillment.116  Consistent with not conflicting with the equal rights of others, 
the government aids the development of human dignity by assisting persons 
both individually and collectively in achieving self-fulfillment.  Government 
serves this purpose by providing protections for basic rights—including the 
rights to life and physical and mental integrity—and the right to protect and 
secure various means to ensure that one’s purposes are not frustrated—
including the rights to property and to contract.  Government further protects 
the right to provide opportunities to enhance one’s purpose fulfillment, such as 
the rights to a decent standard of living, health care, and education.117  In short, 
 
 113. Samar, supra note 37, at 1000 (citing ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON 
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 53 (1982)). 
 114. In their book, authors Beyleveld and Brownsword make the following argument: “(1) 
The Legal Enterprise and knowledge of it involves action  (2) The concept of action commits an 
agent, logically, to the acceptance of a supreme moral principle, the ‘PGC’ [Gewirth’s supreme 
principle of morality that holds one should act in accord with the rights to freedom and well being 
of one’s recipients as well as oneself] (3) Phenomena of the Legal Enterprise can only be 
properly characterized by judging their moral statuses in relation to the PGC.”  DERYCK 
BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT 33 (1986). 
 115. Alan Gewirth explains how a reduction in certain “nonsubtractive goods,” such as when 
contract rights and rights to property are not enforced to protect against cheating and illicit 
takings, leads to a reduction in individual purpose fulfillment, while an increase in certain other 
“additive goods” – like rights to education, healthcare, and a decent standard of living – enhances 
one’s level of purpose fulfillment.  See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON 
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 55-56 (1982) [hereinafter GERWITH, HUMAN RIGHTS]; see 
also ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 54-63 (1978). 
 116. See GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 55-56; see also GEWIRTH, REASON 
AND MORALITY, supra note 115, at 54-63. 
 117. See GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 55-56; see also GEWIRTH, REASON 
AND MORALITY, supra note 115, at 54-63. 
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the view protects many of those rights recognized under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United States in 1948.118 
Consequently, the idea of human agency (in the moral sense of being a 
voluntary purposive actor) is not only at the foundation of moral rights, it is 
also at the foundation of our duty to obey law and the courts’ duty to follow 
the law.  It also can be seen as part and parcel to the protection of human rights 
generally and the promotion of fundamental justice.119  Beyond that, it is no 
doubt a basis for human dignity that supervenes on human agency by 
recognizing that what makes our actions so appealing to us is that they are our 
actions.120 
In the case of same-sex marriage, the underlying practice that needs to be 
unraveled is marriage itself.  What is it?  Why do we as a society value it to the 
point of attaching legal protections to support it?  The application of the 
broader theory of political morality that I have suggested might be able to 
answer these questions.  If so, it would be most useful in resolving the issue of 
whether same-sex marriage should be legally recognized in the same way as 
opposite-sex marriage is recognized.  Without going into too much detail on 
this narrow issue I would like simply to offer a brief outline for how such an 
approach might operate. 
The right to marry (especially if it is based on love and commitment) can 
easily be seen as grounded in the purposive-fulfillment and dignity that will 
result not only for the couple seeking to get married but to all people generally 
affected by the marriage, including family members and, in some cases, as 
with adoption, the broader society.  However, this will only be true if the 
freedom to marry and participate in the rights that accompany marriage in our 
society are not circumscribed by phony state arguments that either beg the 
 
 118. In the Declaration are promoted rights to life, liberty, security; not to be held in slavery 
or subject to torture or inhumane treatment; not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or exile; rights to a 
fair and public trial, privacy, a presumption of innocence, travel and asylum, to change 
nationality, to own property, and to have freedom of thought and worship.  The declaration also 
affirms certain economic rights including rights to social security, rest and leisure, a decent 
standard of living, compulsory primary education, and to participate in the cultural life of the 
community.  See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR 
1968, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNFOLDING THE AMERICAN TRADITION 100-05 (1968). 
 119. Here the notion of justice comes in when, in protecting rights to freedom and well-being, 
one also allows for considerations of due process and equal protection to ensure equality of rights 
and that no one’s rights are taken away or limited—as in the case of imprisonment—without 
adequate justification. 
 120. “Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of type B if and only if two objects 
cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-
properties.” THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 778 (Robert Audi ed., 1995). 
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question or have little to do with respecting human dignity.121  When a society 
affords the right to marry to members of the same sex, it recognizes the 
fundamental dignity of those who choose same-sex marriage by recognizing 
that they have the ability to achieve self-fulfillment through the marital 
relationship.  Society also establishes a precedent for fairness in the 
distribution of all such rights.  In this sense, broadening the definition of 
marriage promotes the ideals of justice in the application as well as in the 
protection of substantive rights.  Indeed, it is this provision of human dignity 
reflected in individual autonomy and fundamental fairness that renders the 
outcome in such a case both morally responsible and legally obligatory. 
Applying the same moral rights of freedom and well-being to Lawrence v. 
Texas,122 a case I earlier described as being on the borderline between a “hard” 
and a “very hard” case, Kennedy’s opinion now can be fully understood.  Not 
only does it undo the mistake previously made in Bowers v. Hardrick123 where 
the Court appealed to a kind of particularist morality on an issue that perhaps 
society was too indifferent to give much attention to, but it does so on the basis 
of recognized human rights principles.  These principles have arguably been 
part of the law all the time, even if they had not been previously recognized.  
Kennedy’s own statement about these principles hints at this connection: 
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the 
European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers 
and to today’s case.  An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was 
a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual 
conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right.  He alleged that 
he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal 
prosecution.  The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid 
under the European Convention of Human Rights . . . . Authoritative in all 
countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 now), 
the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forth was 
insubstantial in our Western civilization.124 
Moreover, upon reflection brought about by the implications that Bowers 
had on the actual lives of gays and lesbians—implications relating to 
discrimination in employment, child rearing, and marriage—Justice O’Connor, 
in her concurring opinion, was motivated to, if not overrule Bowers, at least 
correct its progeny by appealing to equal protection values that give 
 
 121. Here I have in mind arguments that beg the question like defining marriage as 
relationship between a man and a woman where that is  the issue  in question, and arguments that 
fail to substantiate normative claims like legal marriage exists solely to promote a place for 
rearing offspring. 
 122. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 123. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citation omitted). 
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substantive meaning (in terms of bringing in freedom and well-being) to 
constitutional interpretation.125  Thus, using traditional constitutional language, 
but arguably providing it a broader human rights interpretation, the Court (both 
Kennedy’s majority opinion and O’Connor’s concurring opinion) alluded to a 
higher-ordered grounding in which one can find a rational basis for its 
decision. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Looking beyond any specific case outcome, and even beyond the possible 
interpretive approaches one might take to arrive at their meaning, Bowers, 
Goodridge, and Lawrence illustrate the need to search out higher-ordered 
moral theories to find a duty to obey law.  It is no longer enough to simply 
follow what the traditional positivist model of legal analysis affords us.  What 
we gain from appreciating these cases in all their jurisprudential significance is 
that our society is on the verge of a real commitment to the pursuit of justice 
and fundamental rights.  Where that pursuit takes us is going to be somewhat 
uncomfortable for those who do not like to venture into new and uncharted 
intellectual territories, for it will mean not always being as certain of what 
result one should find based on a simple formula or rule.  Still, the pursuit of 
that commitment, which was a goal of Justifying Judgment and an inevitable 
outcome of recent developments in constitutional law, is something that we 
should be prepared to do.  Certainly the developing field of sexual orientation 
and the law has pointed us in this direction. The only question is: Will we be 
prepared and ready to explore? 
 
 125. Id. at 582-83 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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